Hackers linked to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service exploited previously patched iOS and Android vulnerabilities to compromise visitors across multiple websites, Sekoia researchers reported Wednesday. The attackers aimed to steal browser cookies, Wi-Fi passwords, and full mobile device data from iPhone and Android users.
Sekoia assessed with moderate to high confidence that APT29, Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service, conducted the operations. The group targeted sites connected to Russia's war against Ukraine alongside other high-profile entities.
The attack sequence began when mobile users visited one of potentially hundreds of different websites. Malicious JavaScript injected into the traffic profiled the victim's device, then delivered tailored payloads—either iOS or Android—to extract sensitive information.
One target was america250.org, a non-partisan group organizing the 250th anniversary of American independence. Attackers registered america250[.]holiday and used it as a reverse proxy, delivering content from the legitimate site while embedding malicious JavaScript. Researchers said the group likely selected the site due to its association with the national celebration, potentially using the event as a pretext for invitation-themed spear-phishing campaigns.
A second target involved theowo[.]club, which proxied Raffles London OWO. The luxury hotel sits near sensitive UK government institutions, including the Ministry of Defence and 10 Downing Street. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stayed at the hotel during an October 14 visit. By impersonating the hotel, the attackers aimed to target diplomatic delegations and other high-profile guests through spear-phishing.
The hackers also delivered attacks through compromised websites, including a leading Ukrainian gas production company and a Ukrainian web analytics service serving thousands of websites.
Three distinct infection vectors were identified: direct JavaScript injection into traffic from legitimate websites, proxy domains such as america250[.]holiday, and supply-chain compromise of the Ukrainian web analytics service. The injected JavaScript remained consistent across all vectors.
During the initial stage, the JavaScript profiled the visitor's browser and device, allowing attackers to deliver one of three zero-click exploit chains—which function without any user interaction.